

## SURPRISED BY SELF: AUDIBLE THOUGHT IN HELLENISTIC POETRY

GEORGE B. WALSH†

**I**N Greek poetry of the third century B.C.E.—especially in the epigrams of Callimachus and the idylls of Theocritus—the speaking persona expresses his thoughts with such casual, unstudied grace that we never ask ourselves how he might have learned to do this. But there are few models, and nothing really equivalent, in earlier Greek writing. Here is a specimen, so finely made that its oddness almost entirely escapes notice. There are no internal signs, no shrill notes, that could show how far the speaker has moved beyond the resources of self-representation available to Greek poets before him:

εἰπέ τις, Ἡράκλειτε, τεὸν μόνον, ἐς δέ με δάκρυ  
ἦγαγεν· ἐμνήσθην δ' ὀσάκις ἀμφοτέροι  
ἦλιον ἐν λέσχη κατεδύσαμεν, ἀλλὰ σὺ μέν που,  
ξεῖν' Ἀλικαρνησεῦ, τετράπαλαι σποδιή,  
αἱ δὲ τεαῖ ζώουσιν ἀηδόνες, ἦσιν ὁ πάντων  
ἄρπακτὴς Ἀΐδης οὐκ ἐπὶ χεῖρα βαλεῖ.

Callimachus' celebrated epigram on the death of his friend Heraclitus (2 Pf.) would have sounded more conventional if it had been framed as an epitaph—as a colloquy of passerby with corpse (flowing in either direction or both), inscribed upon the gravestone. But the addressee is absent, his grave far away. The dominant feeling is distance, the space that separates Asia Minor from Egypt, past from present, and life from death. Since this is not an epitaph, where dialogues with the dead are conventional, the fiction of Heraclitus' presence ("you," "we") lapses. No one else is listening either. Callimachus is alone, except for his memory, talking to himself, or to an image of his friend projected before his consciousness. Half of the poem consists of a recollection, within which there is nested another recollection: "Someone said" (the first level of memory), "... and I remembered" (the second level). The place where the poet speaks is located within his own mind. And without the grave before him, his thoughts follow impulses of their own, uncontrolled by the discipline of reading an inscription.

In part because he is not really addressing another person, the speaker does not set out to prove something. He merely reacts and reacts again, and again, first to an external stimulus and then, successively, to his own reactions. He changes his mind more than once. The speaker allots only a

moment to pity—he sheds a single tear, where normal, prosaic friends shed many.<sup>1</sup> His single tear yields place to something else, no longer unique but multiplied and repetitive, as memory summons unnumbered scenes of shared experience (“how many times . . .”). He clings to an image of Heraclitus—Heraclitus occupies him in the past (“remembered”) through the present (“your nightingales live”) to an imagined future (“will not touch”)—but the image changes, as nightingales supplant the man. The syntax suggests pacing back and forth within a constricted mental space: the poet sheds a tear, but he remembers better days, but these are gone forever, but poems never die. These movements are recursively structured, making turns within turns, the larger pattern replicating itself in smaller ones: the poem divides grossly into halves at the full stop in the third verse: the second half (“Although, I suppose . . .”) opposes the first. And each portion is itself divided into two parts, the first by a half stop, the second in contrasting clauses marked by coordinated particles.<sup>2</sup>

The speaker’s crucial change of direction comes at the center of the poem, when the narrated story of recollection within recollection slips into present-tense assertion (“they live”), and ultimately into the future (“will not”), by way of a clause with no verb and no fixed time (3–4): “You . . . [were, have been] dust for years.” Does this thought refer to the time when Callimachus first mourned his friend (“you were [already] dust”), or to the poem’s present time (“you have [by now] been dust” for years), when it seems that he has stopped remembering? Did this thought come to him then or does it come only now? We cannot tell. The temporal vagueness of this clause seems to signal a mental slide, from then to now, at the end of which the speaker suffers a shock. His shock can be gauged from the extraordinary emphasis of τετράπαλαι—“dust four ages past”—where “three,” conventionally, would have seemed emphatic enough.<sup>3</sup>

Here, where the speaker stops telling a story and begins reacting to the story he has told—that is, to himself—he also lends thematic status to the fictional setting of his speech. If Heraclitus has been dead for

1. On this detail as “poetic” coloration of a kind otherwise rare in *Epigr.* 2, see B. Snell, “Die Klangfiguren im 2. Epigramm des Kallimachos,” *Glotta* 37 (1958): 1; cf. Myro’s single tear in *Anth. Pal.* 7. 190 (= Anyte 20 G.-P.), an epitaph for a cricket and a cicada.

2. It is not clear that we should count the epigram’s dialectic as resolved: if Hades drags off “everyone” and (equally likely) “everything,” why not Heraclitus’ nightingale-poems? If Callimachus simply wanted to claim immortality for song, he might have chosen a simpler figure. In other Hellenistic poetry, nightingales represent writers more often than texts, allowing their texts an inanimate sort of immortality: cf. *Anth. Pal.* 7. 414 (= Nossis 10 G.-P.); in *Anth. Pal.* 9. 184 (authorship and date uncertain), the poems of Alcman are called nightingales, among many similar comparisons. If we want closure in *Epigr.* 2, we must say that words, even the delicate, birdlike words that Heraclitus produced, can do anything because the conversation of friends has such power: it was strong enough to make the sun go down (κατεδύσμεν); see J. G. MacQueen, “Death and Immortality: A Study of the Heraclitus Epigram of Callimachus,” *Ramus* 11 (1982): 50, and K. J. McKay, *The Poet at Play: Kallimachos and the “Bath of Pallas,”* Mnemosyne Supp. 6 (Leiden, 1962), pp. 91–92, on this conceit. Heraclitus’ nightingales might sing forever, no doubt, in a night brought on by speech.

3. See Snell, “Die Klangfiguren,” p. 1; cf. *Ar. Eq.* 1153.

years ("four times a long while"), it makes little sense to be addressing him as if he were present: there will be no more conversations such as those just recollected ("how many times we brought down the sun"). In place of the man and his speech, the speaker now embraces Heraclitus' poems, and asserts their presence—their immortal persistence—as a substitute for their author's. But these poems do not live as Heraclitus did. They cannot converse, for example, although they are mildly animated as "nightingales." Callimachus stops speaking finally when he can no longer imagine Heraclitus as his interlocutor. (That is, Callimachus' poem stops speaking, or pretending to speak, when it finds that its only interlocutor is other poetry, which can only pretend to speak).

In this way, the speaker arrives at the end of the poem, at his final point, as if by accident, without having planned what he finally wanted to say, and he seems to stop because he has somehow, without trying, worked through the feelings that started him off in the first place. (Coincidentally, he has used up the fiction of conversing.) The discourse embodied by this poem, not the speaker's conscious plan, has brought him where he might have hoped to be. Thus, it seems that we have been observing the speaker's thought itself, truly in motion, as it unfolds in "real time"; we have not merely been attending his speech. The absence of apparent system, the speaker's repetitive back-and-forth movement, suggest that he speaks (or allows himself to think) without reference to any auditor's expectations. We have as a guarantee of his sincerity the fact that he changes his mind unexpectedly, and so affords himself a tiny surprise. And this should surprise us, because his sentiment—the immortality of art—is really conventional; but here the conventional sentiment has to be discovered, as if it were new. And that, of course, is the point, the trick, of the poem. Callimachus wants to slip a commonplace past the censorship of postclassical readers fatigued with the commonplace. Heraclitus' tenuous, fictional presence had the virtue of masking our own actual presence as Callimachus' readers. Since Heraclitus is a kind of auditor who requires no persuading (he is not really listening), we fail to notice that Callimachus has been persuading us.

What have we found in this specimen of Hellenistic self-representation? The poem's discourse seems supple and lively because the speaker, through quiet, unstudied musing, changes his mind. There are thoughts one may have that one cannot formulate except by accident; there are dispositions and impulses not counted in one's last psychic census. The speaker's feeling of discovery, a gentle surprise, seems to guarantee that these were essentially private utterances, not premeditated acts of persuasion, not arguments marshalled before an audience.<sup>4</sup> His surprise is mild, however, and his discourse just barely private. In the epigram for Heraclitus, he says that he faces an auditor, and then lets the auditor fade

4. For a definition of the "interior monologue," which develops from representations of this kind, see D. Cohn, *Transparent Minds: Narrative Modes for Presenting Consciousness in Fiction* (Princeton, 1978), p. 272, n. 31.

from view. This is not wholly private discourse: poets thoroughly habituated to unmediated mind-speech would not write this way; they would drop the fictional audience entirely. And in fact it is not really private discourse, for at some level (that is, where the author confronts us) the impression of privacy has a rhetorical (and that means public) function. But we still need to explain the fact that Callimachus imitates a private kind of discourse so as to display thought in motion.

Where does this image of private discourse come from? The imitation of thought in speech takes its philosophical warrant from Plato, who asserted that thought itself is a kind of silent, interior speaking, and reflection a silent dialogue with yourself.<sup>5</sup> If Plato is right, a poet might reason, it should be easy to verbalize thought audibly. And your thoughts ought to issue into audible speech well formed and intelligible, for they have already submitted to some sort of linguistic censor: even when silently voiced, as Plato would say, they must parse correctly, make sense to some inner ear. (We should expect no chaotic stream-of-consciousness here.)<sup>6</sup> For Callimachus, however, Plato's warrant goes too far and also not far enough. Too far, because Callimachus' most private thoughts do not emerge directly in speech; they are (covertly) shaped by rhetoric aimed at wary, sophisticated readers. Not far enough, because Plato does not account (why should he?) for the key feature of Callimachean private discourse—the feeling of unforeseen discovery a subject derives from his own mind's turning. (By characterizing thought as speech, Plato wants to constrain it to various sorts of regularity.)

Callimachus owes more to literary models than to Plato. In epic poetry, we can overhear private discourse, but it is packaged in a public format. When Homeric heroes make important decisions, they open a dialogue with organs of feeling and thought—θυμός, φρήν, καρδία—arguing as if facing another person.<sup>7</sup> The *Iliad*'s Odysseus, for example, suddenly finds himself alone on the battlefield (11. 403–11):

ὀχθήσας δ' ἄρα εἶπε πρὸς ὃν μεγαλήτορα θυμόν·  
ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω; μέγα μὲν κακὸν αἶ κε φέβωμαι  
πληθὺν ταρβήσας· τὸ δὲ ῥίγιον αἶ κεν ἁλώω  
μοῦνος· τοὺς δ' ἄλλους Δαναοὺς ἐφόβησε Κρονίων.  
ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέετο θυμός;  
οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι κακοὶ μὲν ἀποίχονται πολέμοιο,  
ὃς δὲ κ' ἀριστεύησι μάχῃ ἐνὶ τὸν δὲ μάλα χρεῶ  
ἐστάμεναι κρατερῶς, ἦ τ' ἔβλητ' ἦ τ' ἔβαλ' ἄλλον.  
εἰς ὃ ταῦθ' ὥρμαινε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν,  
τόφρα δ' ἐπὶ Τρώων στίχες ἤλυθον ἀσπιστῶν.

5. See Pl. *Th.* 189E6–90A9; cf. *Soph.* 264A8–B3, *Leg.* 635C6, and F. Dirlmeier, “Vom Monolog der Dichtung zum ‘inneren’ Logos bei Platon und Aristoteles,” *Gymnasium* 62 (1960): 26–41, esp. 33–35.

6. Internal and audible speech need not display the same syntax, of course, but Plato's argument at *Th.* 189E6–90A9 assumes their equal aptness as a medium of reasoning, and so he requires an internal syntax at least as well articulated as the audible.

7. For the general scheme of such speeches, see C. Hentze, “Der Monolog in den homerischen Epen,” *Philologus* 63 (1904): 20.

Hellenistic self-representation clearly owes something to models of this kind. The onset of emotional turmoil seems to shock Odysseus, and what he wants first of all is an explanation ("What's the matter with me?"). Then, he rehearses his alternatives: flight or capture. Apparently, the impulse to flee comes from his θυμός, and so to suppress this impulse Odysseus has only to close the debate—deny his θυμός a voice. Since the speaking self called "I" strictly controls all his mental processes—that is, audible thought—Odysseus has to look at his alternatives only once, and respond once; there are no repetitive, back-and-forth movements such as we found in the relatively unconstrained musing of Callimachus.<sup>8</sup> Homeric mental process is rational: the privileged speaking self makes reasonable choices and all other organs obey.<sup>9</sup> And the picture Homer draws of this process seems rationalized, if not rigorously systematic: the self's uncertainty arises from divisions among his various organs. It is the nature of θυμός to suffer impulses, the nature of "I" to suppress them.<sup>10</sup> Odysseus knows what to expect from his θυμός; its surprises are predictable. The divisions in his self promote a higher unity.

Modern readers have learned to look for an inner voice in lyric, because they take for granted the privacy of lyric utterance, and its unpremeditated, unmediated self-expressive unfolding. For some of us (Hegelians all), these traits define the lyric genre.<sup>11</sup> But Greek lyric knows no generic rule of private, impromptu speech. The lyric poets avoid unmotivated reflection, speech without an audience, as mimetically improbable.<sup>12</sup> Even after the development of soliloquy in tragedy and comedy, speech in monody normally requires a fictional audience, however scantily figured. (Indeed, lyric is sometimes regarded as a dramatic genre, because the speaker locates himself entirely—impersonates himself—within a fictional situation.)<sup>13</sup> For example, the speaker pretends to address a lover, or a god, who is physically present, unlike

8. Just as θυμός can be rational in Homer, thought is usually colored by emotion; for the balance, see E. L. Harrison, "Notes on Homeric Psychology," *Phoenix* 14 (1960): 63–80 (esp. 67, 71), and J. Bremer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton, 1983), pp. 55–57. Θυμός seems likewise amenable to reasoned control in Archil. frag. 128 West, where the speaker instructs his θυμός to think and learn, to "recognize the sort of predictable vicissitude (βυσμός) that afflicts human beings" (128. 7); for the alliance of θυμός and reason, cf. Pl. *Resp.* 441A2.

9. It is possible, however, to "yield to one's θυμός," as Demeter does at *Od.* 5, 126.

10. For the subordination of θυμός to the self, see S. D. Sullivan, "How a Person Relates to θυμός in Homer," *IF* 85 (1980): 138–50, esp. 149.

11. The lyric poet talks to himself, according to a standard view cited by Cohn, *Transparent Minds*, p. 261; and he talks for himself: "In the lyric, it is the . . . need [of the subject] which finds its satisfaction in self-expression and the coming to a knowledge of the soul in this expression of itself," G. W. F. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art*, trans. F. P. B. Osmaston, vol. 4 (London, 1920), p. 195 (originally *Hegels Werke*, Band 10.3: *Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik*, ed. H. G. Hotho [Berlin, 1838], p. 422, quoted and supplemented by K. Hamburger, *The Logic of Literature*<sup>2</sup>, trans. M. J. Rose [Bloomington and London, 1973], p. 234).

12. Given the public, methodically persuasive character of Greek lyric, W. R. Johnson compares it to epideictic oratory: see *The Idea of Lyric: Lyric Modes in Ancient and Modern Poetry* (Berkeley–Los Angeles–London, 1982), p. 30.

13. See *GL* 6:274. 6 Keil, cited by H. Färber, *Die Lyrik in der Kunsttheorie der Antike* (Munich, 1936), "Texte," p. 6; for lyric as a "narrative" genre, however, cf. Procl. ap. Phot. *Bibl. cod.* 239 (5:256 Henry) and schol. Lond. (AE) Dion. Thrax p. 450. 3 Hilgard, cited *ibid.*, p. 5.

Callimachus' figment of an absent friend. In the speaker's autonomous meditation, we imagine, one thought summons the next according to some logic of its own, but public speech always owes some of its form to the audience, which requires a point and a rhetoric adapted to making points. Speech directed at an audience sounds different from private reflection.

For example, Sappho makes a point even where she reports feeling incapacitated by love, in her best-known poem (frag. 31 Lobel-Page), celebrated first by Longinus:

φαίνεται μοι κῆνος ἴσος θεοῖσιν  
 ἔμμεν' ὦνερ, ὅττις ἐνάντιός τοι  
 ἰσδάνει καὶ πλάσιον ἄδω φωνεῖ-  
 σας ὑπακούει  
 καὶ γελαισας ἡμέροεν, τό μ' ἤ μάν  
 καρδίαν ἐν στήθεσιν ἐπτόαισεν,  
 ὥς γὰρ ἔς σ' ἴδω βρόχε' ὥς με φώναι-  
 σ' οὐδ' ἐν ἔτ' εἴκει,  
 ἀλλ' ἄκαν μὲν γλώσσα †εἶγε λέπτον  
 δ' αὐτίκα χρῶ πῦρ ὑπαδεδρόμηκεν,  
 ὀππάτεσσι δ' οὐδ' ἐν ὄρημ', ἐπιρρόμ-  
 βεισι δ' ἄκουαι,  
 †έκαδε μ' ἴδρωσ ψῦχος κακχέεται† τρόμος δὲ  
 παῖσαν ἄγρει, χλωροτέρα δὲ ποίας  
 ἔμμι, τεθνάκην δ' ὀλίγω ἴδιεύης  
 φαῖνομ' ἔμ' αὐται·  
 ἀλλὰ πᾶν τόλματον ἐπεὶ †καὶ πένητα†

First, we hear a proposition, probably abstract and hypothetical:<sup>14</sup> any man who sits near “you” without trembling must resemble a god. Then we hear the evidence: when I see you, I lose my voice, my flesh burns, my ears rumble.<sup>15</sup> No progress can be made here—there is no ongoing meditation—since the speaker began with her conclusion. In the last extant line of the poem, if it is genuine, we hear a different point, counterposed to the first: nevertheless, one must act bravely.<sup>16</sup> Now it becomes clear that the first proposition prepared us for the second. Her lengthy catalog of symptoms, which dominates the extant text, is a foil; it sets us up for a surprise, more succinctly stated, which changes our sense of the whole. In this way, the poem seems almost epigrammatic.<sup>17</sup> Like the first proposition, the second precedes its evidence: where the fragment ends, in the words “even the poor man,” we can glimpse

14. See A. P. Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), pp. 233–34 with n. 9.

15. Or perhaps only “when I sit near you and hear your sweet voice,” with τό (5) referring to all the actions previously enumerated.

16. For the last verse, see the references gathered by Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets*, p. 231, n. 2; with G. Wills, “Sappho 31 and Catullus 51,” *GRBS* 8 (1967): 190, n. 46, and Burnett, *ibid.*, p. 241, I take πᾶν τόλματον as a positive exhortation, inviting adventure, not passive endurance.

17. For the characteristic resolutions of epigram, see B. H. Smith, *Poetic Closure: A Study of How Poems End* (Chicago and London, 1968), pp. 196–210. The surprise, we should note, is worked by the author upon us, not by the speaker upon herself; for a different pattern, see below on, e.g., Callim. *Epigr.* 41.

the idea that if other sorts of disability can be surmounted—if luck or the gods now and then make poor men rich—erotic weakness can be remedied, too; the hardness Sappho recommends may therefore win some reward. And so once again the speaker leads us backward along a path she has already traveled herself.

The auditor's presence implicitly varies in step with the speaker's developing rhetoric. At the start, it is impossible to imagine that Sappho "really" addresses the girl she loves, because she says that the girl makes her speechless. Sappho may be watching her "now," in the poem's present time (even this is doubtful), but the girl cannot hear Sappho speaking. At the end, we can see Sappho gathering strength to speak, to reach for the prize that once (according to her first proposition) would have dazzled her. That is, when the argumentative structure of the poem as a whole falls more firmly into place, it becomes clear that Sappho is not necessarily speechless, if she ever was. It even seems possible—the missing last stanza (or stanzas) might have shown—that this poem itself represents the act of speech to which the speaker finally summons herself. (In this way, the poem embodies, and in its final stanza apparently tries to resolve, a classic lover's paradox: "Because I love you, I lose possession of myself; but I must possess myself to love you.")<sup>18</sup> If this is right, the end of Sappho's argument (courage) was wholly present in the beginning (speech)—she could only have spoken having already learned to act bravely. Like the two smaller propositions contained within it, the poem's larger argument would begin with its conclusion, which it then proceeds to justify and explain. Sappho wants to prove a point to an audience; she does not reflect privately.<sup>19</sup>

The representation of mental process changes markedly for the first time in Euripides. The subject "expresses herself" in language that does not perfectly meet our normal standards of cogency; and her thoughts, as represented in such language, seem labile and uncontrolled.<sup>20</sup> In such cases, we begin to feel that mental life might hold secrets, not only from us but from the subject herself; thoughts can take her where she does not wish to go.<sup>21</sup> Euripides achieves these effects without replacing the

18. Another member of the same extended family: "I only want what I cannot win"; for these patterns, see A. Carson, *Eros the Bittersweet* (Princeton, 1986), esp. pp. 19–20, though she reads Sappho frag. 31 somewhat differently (pp. 12–13).

19. We can trace a different view of Sappho back to Demetrius, who praises her (*Eloc.* 148) for the *χάρις* (specifically, liveliness) she achieves by correcting herself; the best example of this technique (not cited by Demetrius) is frag. 105a L.-P. *λελάθοντο δὲ μαλοδρόπῃες, / οὐ μὲν ἐκλελάθοντ', ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐδύναντ' ἐπικεῖσθαι*. A larger sample of Sappho's poetry might lead us to assess differently her contribution to the representation of thought; cf. in general O. Tsagarakis, *Self-Expression in Early Greek Lyric, Elegiac and Iambic Poetry*, Palingenesia 11 (Wiesbaden, 1977).

20. For the first point, see W. Schadewaldt, *Monolog und Selbstgespräch: Untersuchungen zur Formgeschichte der griechischen Tragödie*, Neue philologische Untersuchungen 2 (Berlin, 1926), pp. 146–47; for the second point, see Schadewaldt, *ibid.*, pp. 193–98, and B. M. W. Knox, "Second Thoughts in Greek Tragedy," in *Word and Action* (Baltimore and London, 1979), pp. 239–41.

21. S. D. Sullivan, "The Function of *θυμός* in Hesiod and the Greek Lyric Poets," *Glotta* 59 (1981): 147–55 (esp. 147–48 and 152–53), locates what might be the beginning of this trend in archaic lyric, where speakers first address the *θυμός* as another person, using the vocative. It seems more important that mental organs should have learned to speak for themselves, as in Soph. *Ant.* 227 *ψυχὴ γὰρ ἤδ' αὖ πολλὰ μοι μυθομένη*.

traditional picture found in Homer. For example, Medea, like Odysseus, exhorts her θυμός (1056); and she asks “What’s the matter with me?” (1049), trying to honor what she takes to be a higher standard of conduct, which forbids yielding to enemies.<sup>22</sup> But Medea and Odysseus are not the same. Odysseus deliberates to conquer his fear, Medea to conquer pity. The speaker in an archaic poem addresses his organs of feeling (θυμός, καρδία) as if they were almost rational, capable of understanding and yielding to the superior wisdom embodied by conscious purpose. In archaic poetry, rational decisions can be enforced; once made, they do not lapse. In the *Odyssey*, for example, if Odysseus tells his heart to “endure” (*Od.* 20. 9–30), his heart obeys, even when Odysseus “himself” (20. 24 αὐτός—whatever that means here) still suffers from unwanted impulses. But in Euripides the speaking self cannot always control what the tumultuous, less articulate persona wants—θυμός, Medea says, is stronger than deliberate planning—and so their inner dialogue now suffers from lapses; decisions once made must be made again. “What I feel” can be objectified, according to well-established patterns (as the θυμός, for example), but not fully owned.<sup>23</sup> Odysseus controlled his θυμός because it belonged to him; precisely when rejecting its discourse, he marked its closeness to himself: “my own θυμός within,” he called it.<sup>24</sup> For Medea, θυμός is no longer precisely “I,” and the figure that posited θυμός, a part of the self, as the self’s interlocutor has now turned literal. Θυμός is really θυμός, something other than “I.” The control of action has become more widely dispersed and less definitely located in reasoned, conscious purpose.<sup>25</sup> Thus, although Homer’s picture of mental process—the dialogue of self with θυμός—persists in Euripides, its individual figures have changed their meaning and orientation.<sup>26</sup>

22. *Med.* 1049 καίτοι τί πάσχω; (cf. *Ion* 1384, on which see Schadewaldt, *Monolog.* p. 226, who finds the passage relatively shallow); cf. *Il.* 11. 404 (ὦ μοι ἐγὼ, τί πάθω;), discussed above. Medea’s decision must be made more than once, however, and it is not easy to say what she has chosen when she stops speaking at 1080. I follow the majority of readers in regarding *Med.* 1056–80 as genuine, despite objections voiced for more than a hundred years, beginning with Bergk.

23. For the pattern, see the following passages, most of them retrieved from the Thesaurus Linguae Graecae: (in tragedy) Eur. *Or.* 466 (ψυχὴ and καρδία), frag. 308.1 (ψυχὴ), *IT* 881 (ψυχά); *IT* 344 (καρδία), Soph. *Trach.* 1260 (ψυχά); (in comedy) Ar. *Vesp.* 757 (ψυχά, in fear), *Eq.* 1194 (θυμός, in fear); (in monody) Archil. frag. 128 W., Theog. 213 (ascription uncertain), 695, 877, 1029, 1070a (ascription uncertain), Ibyc. *PMG* 317b; (choral lyric) Pind. *Ol.* 2. 89, *Nem.* 3. 26, frag. (c) 123. 2, 127. 4 Sn.-M. There is a unique (to my knowledge) invocation of φρήν in *Socratic. epist.* 12. 1. 8. Additional passages are cited by Page ad *Med.* 1056, and by Schadewaldt, *Monolog.* p. 201 with n. 2, citing F. Leo; J. de Romilly, “Patience, mon coeur”: *L’essor de la psychologie dans la littérature grecque classique* (Paris, 1984), p. 42, comments (rightly) that in early Greek literature, the person is rarely divided into parts.

24. Cf. Theoc. *Id.* 30. 11, where θυμός perhaps supplies the self with strength or serves as its witness but no longer properly deliberates; the speaker’s “I” deliberates now (πόλλα δ’ εἰσκαλέσσαις θυμον ἐμαυτῷ διελέξαμην, echoing and altering Homer’s ἀλλὰ τίη μοι ταῦτα φίλος διελέξατο θυμός).

25. For the unity of self in archaic poetry, variously formulated, cf. H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy*, trans. M. Hadas and J. Willis (New York and London, 1973), pp. 76–79; in Homer specifically, E. L. Harrison, “Notes,” p. 67, and N. Austin, *Archery at the Dark of the Moon: Poetic Problems in Homer’s “Odyssey”* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1975), pp. 104–14.

26. Medea’s confrontation with herself (first staged in 431) was exceptional enough to attract Aristophanic parody six years later: with *Med.* 1056 μὴ δῆτα, θυμέ, μὴ σὺ γ’ ἐργάσῃ τάδε, cf. Ar. *Ach.* 450, 480, 483, 485; for parallel passages, see Page ad *Med.* 1056.



Euripides' Medea, therefore, has to make the same decision again and again. It is not just that she makes up her mind and then changes it; she makes up her mind and then changes it often.<sup>27</sup>

About twenty years later, in *Iphigenia among the Taurians*, Euripides breaks new ground again. Now his technique has become more relaxed, and more puzzling. What should we expect when Iphigenia says "I will now deliberate about the matter in hand" and then invokes her καρδία (343–44)? Clearly, a display of reasoning about alternative actions, on the Homeric model:

ὦ καρδία τάλαινα, πρὶν μὲν ἐς ξένους  
γαληνὸς ἦσθα καὶ φιλοικτίρμων ἀεὶ, 345  
ἐς θοῦμόφυλον ἀναμετρομένη δάκρυ,  
"Ἑλληνας ἀνδρας ἡνίκ' ἐς χέρας λάβοις.  
νῦν δ' ἐξ ὀνείρων οἷσιν ἡγριώμεθα,  
δοκοῦσ' Ὀρέστην μηκέθ' ἥλιον βλέπειν,  
δύσσουν με λήψεσθ', οὔτινές ποθ' ἦκετε. 350  
καὶ τοῦτ' ἄρ' ἦν ἀληθές, ἡσθόμην, φίλαι·  
οἱ δυστυχεῖς γὰρ τοῖσι δυστυχεστέροις  
αὐτοὶ κακῶς πράξαντες οὐ φρονοῦσιν εὖ.  
ἀλλ' οὕτε πνεῦμα Διόθεν ἦλθε πάποτε,  
οὐ πορθμῖς, ἥτις διὰ πέτρας Συμπληγάδας 355  
Ἑλένην ἀπήγαγ' ἐνθάδ', ἥ μ' ἀπόλεσεν,  
Μενελεῶν θ', ἵν' αὐτοὺς ἀντετιμωρησάμην,  
τὴν ἐνθάδ' Αὔλιν ἀντιθεῖσα τῆς ἐκεῖ,  
οὐ μ' ὥστε μόσχον Δαναΐδα χειροῦμενοι  
ἔσφαζον, ἱερεὺς δ' ἦν ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ. 360  
οἷμοι—κακῶν γὰρ τῶν τότε οὐκ ἀνημονῶ—  
δσας γενείου χεῖρας ἐξηκόντισα  
γονάτων τε τοῦ τεκόντος, ἐξαρτωμένη,  
λέγουσα τοιάδ'· ὦ πάτερ, νυμφεύομαι  
νυμφεύματ' αἰσχροῖς πρὸς σέθεν· μήτηρ δ' ἐμὲ 365  
σέθεν κατακτείνοντος Ἀργεῖαι τε νῦν  
ὑμνοῦσιν ὑμεναιοῖσιν, αὐλεῖται δὲ πᾶν  
μέλαθρον· ἡμεῖς δ' ὀλλύμεσθα πρὸς σέθεν.  
Ἄιδης Ἀχιλλεύς ἦν ἄρ', οὐχ ὁ Πηλέως,  
ὃν μοι προσείσας πόσιν, ἐν ἀρμάτων ὄχοις 370  
ἐς αἵματηρὸν γάμον ἐπόρθμευσας δόλω.  
ἐγὼ δὲ λεπτὸν ὄμμα διὰ καλυμμάτων  
ἔχουσ', ἀδελφόν τ' οὐκ ἀνελόμην χεροῖν,  
—ὃς νῦν ὀλωλεν—οὐ κασιγνήτη στόμα  
συνῆψ' ὑπ' αἰδοῦς, ὥς ἰοῦσ' ἐς Πηλέως 375  
μέλαθρα· πολλὰ δ' ἀπεθέμην ἀσπάσματα  
ἐς αὐθις, ὥς ἤξουσ' ἐς Ἄργος αὐ πάλιν.  
ὦ τλήμον, εἰ τέθνηκας, ἐξ οἷων καλῶν

27. For changes of mind in general, see Knox, "Second Thoughts." In archaic poetry, Hector's deliberation just before meeting Achilles (*Il.* 21. 99–130) comes closest to repeating itself: Hector first thinks of a reason to fight, then imagines an alternative; then he rejects this alternative, recurring to his first position. Hector, moreover, does not act upon his last thought—his decision, if he really decided, does not stay made—for when he faces Achilles himself, he runs away.

ἔρρεις, Ὀρέστα, καὶ πατρός ζηλωμάτων . . .  
 τὰ τῆς θεοῦ δὲ μέφομαι σοφίσματα, 380  
 ἥτις βροτῶν μὲν ἦν τις ἄψηται φόνου,  
 ἢ καὶ λοχείας ἢ νεκροῦ θίγη χεροῖν,  
 βωμῶν ἀπείργει, μυσαρὸν ὡς ἡγουμένη,  
 αὐτὴ δὲ θυσίας ἡδεταὶ βροτοκτόνοις.  
 οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως ἔτεκεν ἄν ἡ Διὸς δάμαρ 385  
 Λητῶ τοσαύτην ἀμαθίαν. ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν  
 τὰ Ταντάλου θεοῖσιν ἐστιάματα  
 ἄπιστα κρίνω, παιδὸς ἥσθῃναι βορᾶ,  
 τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ', αὐτοὺς ὄντας ἀνθρωποκτόνους,  
 ἐς τὴν θεὸν τὸ φαῦλον ἀναφέρειν δοκῶ· 390  
 οὐδένα γὰρ οἶμαι δαιμόνων εἶναι κακόν.

Iphigenia has to choose whether or not to sacrifice strangers to Artemis, following the Taurians' local custom. Immediately, though, she begins to reminisce: she used to be gentle, recent grief has hardened her; this, she realizes, is a rule of human nature. Menelaus and Helen, who really deserve her enmity, have remained out of reach. They bear responsibility for killing her at Aulis—Menelaus, Helen, and her own father, Agamemnon, who killed her despite her pleading. (She lives now among the Taurians because Artemis snatched her away at the last minute.) She failed to embrace her brother Orestes, when leaving home for Aulis long ago, because she expected to see him again. Now, since he seems to have died, she grieves over lost opportunity.

To this point (379), Iphigenia has spoken almost like an Alexandrian. She begins with a rhetorical project (that is, to set out the terms of deliberation) but lets it go, and instead her thoughts wander through a history of injury and loss that fixes precisely her mood in the present moment. This is not soliloquy—she addresses friendly bystanders—but her primary audience seems nevertheless to be herself, because she has no motive to address any other person. But this segment of the speech ends abruptly, so abruptly that Monk and Nauck imagined that the extant text was incomplete. With her next breath, in a sententious, public style, Iphigenia returns to formal deliberation. On theological grounds, she says, one cannot really believe that Artemis requires human sacrifice. The force of this observation is so great that she does not even bother to state its consequence: Therefore, I shall sacrifice no one.

It is not easy to see what happened here. The decisive shift seems to come in the deliberative part of her speech: having first complained about divine sophistry, she now says (385–86) that Artemis cannot be morally obtuse (ἀμαθής). The last sentence (386–91) confirms and explains this profession. But reminiscence outweighs deliberation in Iphigenia's speech by a ratio of three to one, and this should make us suspicious about deliberation. Can it really be that she decides in an instant, now for the first time, after many years of acquiescence, not to perform sacrifices, simply on grounds of theory? She has personal reasons for deciding this, but she was not allowed to express them. Surely, she has just caught herself empathizing with her victim's terror. Why not

say so? Is interior speech necessarily lacunose; are there always such gaps in thought? But Iphigenia is supposed to be addressing her friends, and she pauses twice to explain her views more clearly (351, 361); this is public discourse, subject to public standards of cogency. Iphigenia's meandering reminiscence represents her thoughts more or less directly, but not all her thoughts—certainly, not her reasons. Her deliberation expresses reasons, but they are disconnected from the flow of her thoughts. Euripides surely wants us to feel that we have not heard everything, that a mental process was taking place behind Iphigenia's words, rather than in them.<sup>28</sup>

With this turn, the archaic representation of thought completes its evolution.<sup>29</sup> It no longer seems possible to expose thought by letting the self converse with its organs; the figure of an interior but quasi-public discourse has mostly broken down, except as a self-conscious archaism.<sup>30</sup> There is little reason now to address θυμός or καρδία, and so in Hellenistic writing the convention falls into desuetude. The new, Alexandrian style of self-representation needs a new picture of the self. To picture how Callimachus' subject thinks unforeseen thoughts through relaxed, audible musing, we should look at Callimachean figures. These, we shall see, differ sharply from the archaic picture, in which the self is unified and centrally controlled, although divided into functionally differentiated organs; and these figures differ also from the picture drawn along archaic lines by Euripides, in which the self is radically divided, sometimes uncontrolled, sometimes imperfectly coherent.

In *Epigram* 28, for example, the speaker surprises himself with his own words, which return to him as if coming from someone else:

ἐχθαίρω τὸ ποίημα τὸ κυκλικόν, οὐδὲ κελεύθῳ  
χαίρω, τίς πολλοὺς ὦδε καὶ ὦδε φέρει·  
μισέω καὶ περίφοιτον ἐρώμενον, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κρήνης  
πίνω· σικκαίνω πάντα τὰ δημόσια.  
Λυσάνη, σὺ δὲ ναίχι καλὸς καλός—ἀλλὰ πρὶν εἰπεῖν  
τοῦτο σαφῶς, Ἦχῶ φησί τις: "ἄλλος ἔχει."

Echo is, but sounds as if she were not, his own speaking voice, or his audible thoughts. By mishearing himself, the speaker learns something he

28. The jealous woman in Herodas' fifth mime likewise changes her mood behind a veil of words: she threatens her unfaithful slave at length with torture and humiliation, until she relents in a flash, when offered a reasonable pretext; her vengeful feelings have satisfied themselves already—her victim, after all, must be terrified—but she never confesses to having changed her mind.

29. It would be desirable, in a more thorough history than I can offer here, to characterize the representation of thought in Attic comedy. For a sketch of this history, see F. Leo, *Der Monolog im Drama* (Berlin, 1908), pp. 44–45, 78–89; J. D. Bickford, "The Soliloquy in Ancient Comedy" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton, 1920; privately publ. 1922), counts and classifies soliloquies with respect to content and function (for example, "comment," "exposition," "announcement," "deliberation"): of these types, most are not private forms of self-expression.

30. Callimachus archaizes: he invokes his θυμός (instead of a muse) to open *Del.* (cf. *Dian.* 103, frag. 75. 5); in frag. 31b, his θυμός seems actually to speak with its own voice, a logical but unconventional extension of the trope. Cf. also Theoc. *Id.* 30. 24, Lycoph. *Alex.* 258 (ὦ τάλαινα καρδία, a lament), *Anth. Pal.* 5. 131. 3 (ψυχή), Chariton 6. 1. 9. 3 (ψυχή). In Apollonius, on the other hand, the θυμός does not take part (even passively) in conversations: when Medea voices her thoughts, she addresses no organ; she simply speaks.

must have known but would not consciously articulate. This poem records the moment of self-enlightenment and surprise when knowledge and thought, half-suppressed, slip free. (This poem makes even better sense as a record of (re)discovery, the surfacing of knowledge already possessed, if we insist upon a literary subtext: the poet finds that Lysanias belongs to some other lover as he might suddenly realize that a poem he has just written, and loves too well, resembles some classical or contemporary model, imitated unconsciously or by accident.)<sup>31</sup>

Surprise here comes from imperfect self-awareness, or failed self-deception. In *Epigram* 31, the speaker knows himself too well; he is divided by feelings from which he cannot escape:

ὦργευτής, Ἐπίκυδες, ἐν οὔρεσι πάντα λαγῶν  
διφᾶ καὶ πάσης ἔχνια δορκαλίδος  
στίβῃ καὶ νιφετῷ κεχρημένος· ἦν δέ τις εἴπη  
"τῇ, τόδε βέβληται θηρίον," οὐκ ἔλαβεν.  
χοῦμός ἔρωσ τοιόσδε· τὰ μὲν φεύγοντα διώκειν  
οἶδε, τὰ δ' ἐν μέσσω κείμενα παρπέταται.

I have given the text as it is found in the standard modern editions (Pfeiffer, Gow and Page), where ἔρωσ takes a lowercase epsilon. But something is wrong. The speaker's kind of desire is a personal agent, the subject of verbs describing manlike and godlike actions (οἶδε, παρπέταται). It resembles a hunter, another personal agent. The speaker's ἔρωσ, then, is clearly personified—"Eros"—and the simile (my Eros is like a hunter) surely depends upon conventional images of Eros, a winged hunter armed with a bow.<sup>32</sup> Why have editors denied him a proper name? Because the speaker is telling us about something inside himself, something quite special, not everyone's kind of desire; and because the last couplet of *Epigram* 31 caps and explains the two preceding: as we pass from the image of hunting to its decoding, we expect a literal—that is, psychologically realistic—term instead of a figure, "desire" rather than winged Eros. But the speaker's point nevertheless depends upon the figure. He seems uncomfortable with his own sexual fastidiousness. He might, after all, like to enjoy for a moment the guaranteed acquiescence of prey already caught. He cannot do this because his feelings prevent him, and so his feelings seem alien. Since he cannot cooperate with himself in simple pleasure-seeking, he personifies the source of his frustration as (a peculiar kind of) Eros, a power greater than (one aspect of) his own inclination. Eros is a person here because he has a personality; he is not desire merely, but desire informed with ethos. The speaker suffers here from the same fastidiousness that surfaces in *Epigram* 28, where his inhibition is personified as another sort of second self, Echo.<sup>33</sup>

31. Differently, G. Giangrande, "Callimachus, Poetry and Love," *Eranos* 67 (1969): 41.

32. Meleager seems to treat ἄγριος "Eros as a particular type (*Anth. Pal.* 5.177 = 37 G.-P. κηρύσσω τὸν Ἔρωτα, τὸν ἄγριον· . . . ἔστι δ' ὁ παῖς . . . ὠκύς . . . φαρετροφόρος); cf. *Anth. Pal.* 12.85.4 (= 115 G.-P.), 12.113 (= 62 G.-P., an inversion, with Eros as prey); for erotic hunting, cf. Rhianus *Anth. Pal.* 12.14.6 (= 5 G.-P.) and Theoc. *Anth. Pal.* 9.338 (= 19 G.-P. = 3 Gow, where Daphnis is hunted by Pan).

33. This observation depends upon punctuating verse 6 with Pfeiffer, after σαφῶς.

It would probably be better, then, to print Ἐρως with an uppercase epsilon in *Epigram* 31.<sup>34</sup> The problem for editors comes from the way Callimachus personifies against expectation; our uncertainty—is this the speaker's personal desire, or divine, personified Eros?—matches his imperfect identity to himself.

In *Epigram* 41, which evokes the archaic model of self-division in order to change it, one half of the speaker's soul worries about the other:

ἡμισὺ μευ ψυχῆς ἔτι τὸ πνέον, ἡμισὺ δ' οὐκ οἶδ'  
 εἴτ' Ἐρως εἴτ' Ἀΐδης ἤρπασε, πλὴν ἀφανές.  
 ἢ ῥά τιν' ἐς παίδων πάλιν ὄχετο; καὶ μὲν ἀπείπον  
 πολλάκι· “τὴν δρῆσιν μὴ ὑποδέχεσθε νέοι.”  
 †δούκισυνιφeson· ἐκέϊσε γάρ ἡ λιθόλευστος  
 κείνη καὶ δῦσερως οἶδ' ὅτι που στρέφεται.

The speaker divides himself here not into different organs, as in archaic poetry, but (less rationally) into two halves of a single organ, one half ignorant of the other.<sup>35</sup> Somehow, between the beginning and the end of this poem, he moves from ignorance of himself (1 οὐκ οἶδ') to knowledge (6 οἶδ'), and at least part of his self-knowledge comes as a surprise, marked by the particle ῥά (3). He seems to reason aloud, letting slip the truth of the word πολλάκι: innumerable precedents—a long sexual history—indicate what has happened to the poet now, although only in a general way, for while he knows that his soul has gone off chasing boys, he does not know which boy she chases. Or so he says.<sup>36</sup>

But *Epigram* 41 sheds no comforting light on the soul's inner working; pretending to answer one question, it generates more. As the speaker moves from ignorance to knowledge, the runaway part of his soul has somehow transformed itself from neuter “half” (ἡμισὺ) to feminine “fugitive” (δρῆσιν, κείνη). The word δρῆστις is rare and its gender highly marked. The change of gender serves as an oblique kind of confession: the runaway is feminine because it is the soul (ψυχή, a feminine noun)—the whole soul, not half. If the subject has not quite split his soul into halves, two things follow. The speaker must be what was left when the (whole) soul departed—that is, a corpse. Or the speaker now knows where the fugitive has gone because he is a fugitive, too—although speaking to us “here,” he has already yielded to love, having gone, figuratively, “over there” (ἐκέϊσε). But this also means, as we would say, “on the other side,” among the dead in Hades. In that case, love and death are the same; the speaker is a corpse precisely because he yielded wholly to love. And so he should have known

34. Cf. *Epigr.* 30. 3–4 δαίμων / οὐμός, referring to the speaker's love for a particular person. *Epigr.* 31 probably responds to Asclepiades 23 G.-P. οὐμός Ἐρως. Callimachus also invokes “my Calliope” (frag. 75. 77) and “my muse” (or “my Muse”?) (frag. 112. 1), a collocation found nowhere earlier to my knowledge.

35. Cf. Homer's expression ἐδαίζετο θυμός (*Il.* 9. 8, 15. 629; cf. 14. 20), where the etymological sense (“θυμός was split into portions”) is not exploited, although it was evident to Eustathius (ad *Il.* 9. 4–8 [2.644. 2 van der Valk]): δαῖζονται, ὃ ἐστι μερίζονται βουλαῖς.

36. For “reasoning aloud,” cf. *Epigr.* 15.

directly where his half-soul fled, without extrapolating from precedent, because he was never really divided.

A suspicious reader will now say that the speaker has thoroughly deceived us. Or he has deceived himself. If he always knew that his soul felt love, he should also have known whom she favors—erotic fantasy (this is what the soul's departure signifies) requires an object. And if the soul is a "fugitive," she cannot have been "kidnapped," as the speaking half suggested at first, unless she now flees from her kidnapper; but she seems to be running toward him. Still, we are not allowed to decide—our minds must be divided like the poet's dichotomous soul. Does his runaway part deserve to die by stoning (5), like a criminal, or should she be forgiven, because of diminished capacity (δύσερως, "sick with love")? Callimachus joins these alternatives with καί as if the speaker entertained two points of view but could not rationalize them.

This is not a simple case of ambivalence, although the speaker clearly feels ambivalent—he wants, and does not want, to run away. More to the point, he feels unsure about the basis of motive, about knowledge and the structure of the self—unsure whether he has two selves or one.<sup>37</sup> Callimachus' kind of self has layers and aspects, rather than organs distinguished by function. Echo properly gives back your very own words; if these words sound alien, you are not yourself. If the soul falls apart, how does one half differ from the other? What happens between them? By multiplying selves without differentiating between them, Callimachus opens the way to self-deception and self-enlightenment, that is, to a new kind of reflexive, more essentially private thought.<sup>38</sup>

Even naive subjects (or especially these)—the rustic figures of Theocritean pastoral—can display this kind of complexity. In Theocritus, as in Callimachus, when the traditional structures of public discourse break down and inner voices become audible, the speaker doubles himself and turns reflexive, losing his simple identity to himself. Again, with this loss, self-surprise and self-deception become possible. For example, *Idyll* 11 of Theocritus, a pastoral lover's song, seems to model itself upon a well-defined type of composition—the paraclausithyron, a lover's lament at his sweetheart's door. Here, the Cyclops Polyphemus sits on a beach and sings to the nymph Galatea, who remains somewhere offshore, beneath the sea. He sings again and again without getting an answer; Galatea is not even listening, as far as we can tell—perhaps his songs are inaudible under water. And so, the fiction of an auditor—something given by the conventions of the paraclausithyron—wears out; the speaker is, in every way that matters, alone. Finally, Polyphemus

37. The kind of doubling felt by Hellenistic subjects differs, I think, from the primitive notion of the soul as a "second self," which E. Rohde (rightly or wrongly) found in Homer: *Psyche*<sup>8</sup>, trans. W. B. Hillis, vol. 1 (New York, 1925; repr. 1966), p. 6; cf. J. Bremer, *Early Greek Concept*, p. 6, J.-P. Vernant, "Figuration de l'image et catégorie du double: Le colossos," in *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, rev. ed. (Paris, 1985), pp. 325–38.

38. Of course, we too do not know whether the soul in *Epigr.* 41 is really divided: uncertain that the speaker deceives himself, not us, we cannot be sure that his discourse is private, not public.

stops in frustration, and addresses himself instead of the nymph (72): ὦ Κύκλωψ Κύκλωψ, πᾶ τὰς φρένας ἐκπεπότασαι; As we now expect, reflection slips in (here, it erupts) when the conventional auditor departs.

In this protest, we can see an archaic pattern modified. Polyphemus pulls himself up short when his φρένες seem to have gone astray, more or less as Odysseus asks "Why does my θυμός argue these things?" or "What's the matter with me?"<sup>39</sup> But Polyphemus says "Where have *you* gone astray?": φρένες specifies the site of error, the part of the self directly affected; he identifies the problem as his own, just a shade more emphatically than Odysseus, and certainly more emphatically than Medea, whose persona is riven by counterposed forces. And Polyphemus addresses himself by name, whole self facing whole self, instead of addressing some organ of feeling, such as θυμός or καρδιά.<sup>40</sup> Polyphemus is clearly a single, unified subject; but he is also in some mysterious way divided, like the Callimachean speaker doubled by Echo or Eros, or split but into indistinguishable parts. We can rationalize Polyphemus' division from himself, if we wish: Polyphemus now (the speaker) differs sharply from Polyphemus as he was a moment earlier (the addressee): now he is altogether cured, before he was altogether sick with love. Verse 72, with its peculiar, emphatic apostrophe, shows us where the speaker's mind has changed, where in the course of speaking he surprises himself. Polyphemus surprises himself as soon as he begins to reflect, with an instantaneous burst of self-knowledge.

So far, we have only a rudimentary reading of a complex, controversial poem. But Polyphemus is clearly an Alexandrian subject, and his change of heart seems directly embodied in his speech; we feel we can point out exactly where his thoughts change direction. Some parts of the picture are missing, of course. Taken alone, verse 72 simply marks a pragmatic crisis: Polyphemus' song has achieved no effect, and so here he decides not to sing. Precisely the same thing happens in *Idyll* 3, where another bumpkin serenades his sweetheart, this time outside her cave, where she can certainly hear him but pretends that he does not exist. The singer in *Idyll* 3 tries everything; having tried everything, when his head begins to ache, he gives up.<sup>41</sup> But Polyphemus' case is different, because, paradoxically, it exemplifies not failure but success. It is supposed to show how anyone can win release from desire, or at least from the suffering caused by desire. The Muses of Pieria, says the narrator (1-3), are a drug (φάρμακον) that cures love; poetry will stop us from

39. See *Il.* 11. 403-11, and cf. Eur. *Med.* 1049, both discussed above.

40. Self-naming is much rarer than the appeal to organs of feeling: H. Lausberg, *Elemente der literarischen Rhetorik*<sup>2</sup> (Munich, 1963), p. 146 (§442.3c), cites only the latter form of self-address; A. S. F. Gow, *Theocritus*<sup>2</sup>, vol. 2 (Cambridge, 1965), p. 219 (ad *Id.* 11. 72) gives only three earlier examples of self-naming: Eur. *Med.* 402 (which we have already identified as an exceptional text) and Men. *Sam.* 111 (325), 134 (349).

41. Tityrus, though, manages to make giving up a kind of trying: as a last gesture toward Amaryllis, he invites her to witness with pleasure his imminent death, which she causes (*Id.* 3. 53-54). For the gesture of turning away from a well-defined rhetorical path associated with a specific kind of composition, see F. J. Cairns, *Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* (Edinburgh, 1972), pp. 138-57, who calls this "reaction"; on *Id.* 3 and 11, see *ibid.*, pp. 143-48.

wanting things we cannot have, or stop the pain of wanting. How does this φάρμακον work?<sup>42</sup>

Polyphemus begins by praising his sweetheart, and recalls the moment he fell in love. In this state, he cannot understand why she feels nothing for him—lovers ought to be loved, he seems to assume; the world should take its shape from his feelings. He illustrates this principle with a touching query: why does she visit only while he sleeps and flee when he wakes? That is, why are his dreams of her presence only dreams? Why must dreaming differ from waking vision? Then, he finds an answer, his discovery reported in the present tense because it is contemporaneous with his utterance (30): “I know [i.e., I am beginning to see] why you flee.” He has glimpsed himself through her eyes and sees his own single, hairy brow stretched straight from ear to ear. That is, he induces himself to accept the privacy and subjectivity of his own dreams when he discovers another person’s different subjectivity. But immediately, he slips back into himself and looks around. Here, in the pastoral world that he observes with his own eye, he finds another reality, larger than what Galatea sees in his face—a thousand cows and an inexhaustible supply of cheese: he retreats from multiplying subjectivities by grasping at something that seems fixed, impersonal, and objective. Polyphemus insists upon the palpable reality of his gifts. He likes to quantify (a thousand cows, eleven fawns, four bears) and make lists (laurel, cypress, ivy, grapes, fresh water). These realities—refracted through the pleasure he takes in them—now seduce him, so that once again he forgets the Other, certain that his own feelings must be universal. “Who could choose the sea and waves?” he wonders (49). Surely, no one. But then, he suffers another revolution. If his feelings do not prevail, if the nymph persists in seeing a picture different from the one he sees, then let her extirpate his feelings, by destroying his organs of consciousness, the soul and the eye (52–53).<sup>43</sup> He wants to surrender himself completely, to let her vision prevail over his, but it turns out that he cannot remain wholehearted about this. Even in fantasy, when he tries to imagine what deep-sea pleasures the nymph enjoys, something holds him back, bound to terrestrial reality, to what he knows. He can imagine having gills but not the privilege of kissing her face; and he pictures himself carrying flowers under the sea, but not flowers that grow at different times of the year. Polyphemus knows that the undersea world is inaccessible; it would even be hard for a solitary Cyclops to learn how to swim. His final appeal is desperate, and, with yet another revolution, it ignores the

42. Does the narrator claim that poetry is a privileged kind of speech? Can you talk yourself out of spiritual illness with any style of speaking, but especially well if you speak in verse? Or only if you speak in verse? Would written verse work, or only spoken? Would a ready-made poem work, or only a poem of one’s own? Does poetry merely channel thought, so you can think yourself out of love, or does verbal (spoken or written) form make a difference?

43. Gow suggests (*Theocritus*<sup>2</sup>, 2:217 ad loc.) that the fire with which Galatea is invited to burn Polyphemus is the fire of passion: he offers her devotion, interpreting the conventional image of burning passion with “grotesque literalness.” But then why burn not only his soul, love’s proper organ, but also his eye? He seems to value his eye more highly. On the other hand, if he offers to destroy his eye because of its ugliness, why burn his soul as well?



lesson of his last, failed fantasy. He forgets to go home, he now says—so may she (63–64); his feelings absorb him—let them absorb her, too. But he should already know that no one feels another creature's pleasure, or sees what another sees.

Of course, upon saying that he forgets to go home, Polyphemus remembers; he could not say this if he were wholly bewitched. It is not surprising, then, that his song properly ends here, along with his hopeful fantasies.<sup>44</sup> Now he wants only to blame his mother, because all-providing mother-love did not win him Galatea. He realizes that he has no other auditor, and so now he addresses himself overtly, as we saw. He realizes how silly it is to be pining for Galatea and crying for his mother. He is cured.<sup>45</sup> In fact, if the narrator told the truth (if song is what cures love), he was cured when he stopped singing (at verse 66), when his last plea failed. After that, he convalesces.

Now we can begin to see how the φάρμακον works. Polyphemus cures himself with the Muses' art, but artlessly, without skill or premeditation. The fact that he seems repeatedly to forget what he learned, as he wavers between solipsism and empathy, lends his discourse the same sort of aimless, back-and-forth quality that we found in Callimachus. It is a sign that he is talking to himself, even when he addresses Galatea. He reacts, and reacts again, to his own ostensibly public argument, without knowing what he wants to say next. To work the Muses' cure, you must overhear words you have addressed to someone else, eavesdrop on your own speech, and catch at meanings you did not intend. As you think about what you say, you will say what you think. Your public speech will become reflexive and private.

Does this explanation fit what the narrator tells us? We ought to worry when we hear that the singing cure is "hard to find" but also "light" (3–4), and that Polyphemus managed "most easily" (7). Is it hard or, after all, easy? Easy only because the cure entails deluding oneself (the Cyclops believes that he is "somebody," an important, desirable being), and so really hard?<sup>46</sup> Does one have to sing well to find comfort, or only often? We will not find reliable answers to these questions in the narrator's story, it turns out. The Cyclops' song is not quoted verbatim but synthesized (18 αἶδε τοιαῦτα), an extract from many songs performed on many occasions.<sup>47</sup> When we are told that Polyphemus "found the cure" (17 τὸ

44. It would be bizarre if Polyphemus continued to sing after verse 66, since he no longer serenades Galatea, μουσισδῶν (81) notwithstanding. Tityrus' theatrical leavetaking in *Id.* 3, where he clearly addresses Amaryllis despite having concluded his song (52), seems to indicate that everything we heard was performance.

45. His notion that other, terrestrial girls will accept him does not cure him of love—it consoles him for having failed with a sea nymph.

46. For the Cyclops' self-delusion, see E. W. Spofford, "Theocritus and Polyphemus," *AJP* 90 (1969): 34–35, and S. Goldhill, "Framing and Polyphony: Readings in Hellenistic Poetry," *PCPS* 32 (1986): 33.

47. Does Homer ever quote a general rather than a particular speech? The bucolic narrator's confession indicates how far we have come from Homer's kind of representation: it is an announcement, once inconceivable, that the narrator is a poet according to Aristotle's notion, because he represents not merely facts but tendencies.

φάρμακον εὔρε) at some particular moment, we have no sure way of locating that event in its context because the dimension of time has been obscured by the narrator.<sup>48</sup> But I think we already know why the Muses' cure for love is both easy and hard. You have to find it for yourself, that is, blindly; you cannot be shown, as Theocritus' poem ostensibly shows, how to work it. And since this kind of discourse never progresses logically (its therapeutic effect comes from repetition), the change of mind that it catalyzes will always seem arbitrary, and often surprising; there is no reason why it might come at one time rather than another.<sup>49</sup> Thus, the narrator's intervention, which makes it impossible to say precisely when and how Polyphemus was cured, conceals what was already indeterminate. The unreliability of this poem as a demonstration reflects the special nature of what it demonstrates.

Like *Idyll* 11, a deviant paraclausithyron, *Idyll* 12 presents itself first (according to Francis Cairns) as a specific kind of composition aiming at a specific rhetorical effect. Since late antiquity, this kind has sometimes been called προσφωνητικόν, sometimes ἐπιβατήριον.<sup>50</sup> Such compositions (verse or prose) welcome and praise a traveler upon his arrival; the speaker frequently addresses someone more powerful than himself—a provincial governor, or the object of love (always, in antiquity, more powerful than the lover)<sup>51</sup>—and so the speaker means to ingratiate himself, to win favor from a person empowered to grant favor. “Expressions of affection,” sometimes highly elaborated, are a standard ingredient.<sup>52</sup> In *Idyll* 12, the (nameless) speaker welcomes a (nameless) boy after an absence of two days. Although they were separated only briefly, relief makes the speaker gush with joy. But at a certain point, his rhetoric subtly changes direction, and the underlying structure of the προσφωνητικὸς λόγος begins to soften. Here again, as in *Idyll* 11, this loss of rhetorical focus indicates a lapse into private reflection.

Of course, this poem is a queer προσφωνητικόν. The traveler has been absent only briefly and returns, for all we know, from the house next door. To greet someone so little removed with such a composition exceeds the norms of rhetoric; simply by choosing this form, the speaker exaggerates, and his excess prepares us for the lapse that follows (12. 1–9):

ἤλυθες, ὦ φίλε κοῦρε· τρίτη σὺν νυκτὶ καὶ ἦοι  
ἤλυθες· οἱ δὲ ποθεῦντες ἐν ἡματι γηράσκουσιν.  
ὅσσον ἔαρ χειμῶνος, ὅσον μῆλον βραβύλοιο  
ἦδιον, ὅσσον ὄϊς σφετέρης λασσιωτέρῃ ἀρνός,

48. The aorist εὔρε contrasts with imperfect ἄειδε in the next verse. With its temporal equivocality, the poem violates one of the six basic requirements for composing narrative stated by Aphthon. *Progymn.* 2. 9–10.

49. For the claim that Polyphemus moves progressively toward disengagement and cure, cf. A. Brook, “Theocritus’ *Idyll* 11: A Study in Pastoral,” *Arethusa* 4 (1971): 73–81.

50. Προσφωνητικόν by Cairns, *Generic Composition*, pp. 18–19; ἐπιβατήριον by G. Giangrande, “Theocritus’ Twelfth and Fourth *Idylls*: A Study in Hellenistic Irony,” *QUCC* 12 (1971): 95–113. The terms derive from Men. Rhet. 377. 32–78. 3 and 414. 31–18. 4.

51. Cf. Cairns, *Generic Composition*, p. 30.

52. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 22.

ὅσσον παρθενική προφέρει τριγάμοιο γυναικός,  
 ὅσσον ἐλαφροτέρη μόσχου νεβρός, ὅσσον ἀηδῶν  
 συμπάντων λιγύφωνος αἰδοτάτη πετεηνῶν,  
 τόσσον ἔμ' εὐφρηνας σὺ φανείς, σκιερὴν δ' ὑπὸ φηγόν  
 ἡελίου φρύγοντος ὁδοιπόρος ἔδραμον ὥς τις.

Why such ecstasy? This is surely the voice of gratitude; the speaker's mounting sexual fever has been relieved, just when it seemed unbearable. The coolness that he found within the oak tree's shade is what every lover seeks when scorched by desire. The whole poem, then, describes a falling away from the climax that precedes it. The key moment has already passed: "You came. . . . You pleased me . . . , I ran. . . ." <sup>53</sup>

A chasm separates Before from After, a chasm so deep that on either side there are different kinds of arithmetic. The poem begins with a glimpse of time before, in which ordinary sorts of measurement were impossible. The boy returns on the third day, and so he missed coming only one; but the speaker wants him every day. He can tolerate no absence of any length, because sexual longing so intensifies experience that a single day is a lifetime (2); at day's end, he has grown old, irrecoverably. He multiplies comparisons ("You gladdened me as much as spring is sweeter than winter, and apple sweeter than sour blackthorn fruit," and so on), as if to say, "I want more than any known measurement can figure." On the other hand, once the speaker forgets what absolute emptiness felt like, he remembers how to count higher than one. Now (in time after) he can say, For every pain you inflict, you confer twice that much benefit (25–26). This is the proportion he needs to survive, for the boy stayed away—and caused pain—forty-eight hours instead of twenty-four; by giving double pleasure—two days' ration instead of one—the boy precisely makes up for his absence. But we know that after another two days have passed, when the speaker exhausts his extra ration, that added day will again become a lifetime, and his need incalculably great.

Relief liberates the speaker to say things he might have hesitated to say, or even to think, in the first flush of reunion. He can now observe, for example, that his feelings were never fully reciprocated (11–12); and he can hint that some kisses are false coinage, some morsels of pleasure really promise pain (35–37). This poem, then, has no work of seduction to perform. And because the speaker does not labor under an overriding rhetorical necessity to conciliate his auditor, his mind and tongue can wander a little: from delight in favors received, to wistful fantasy of something still better; then back to gratitude, now asserted as a way of suppressing regret (23–26)—a self-persuasive gesture; and then finally into another fantasy, in which the addressee is evoked faintly and ironically, if at all. Seen as a whole, this poem exhibits the repetitive, back-and-forth movement of speech that does not aim at proving a

53. Gow unaccountably translates aorist ἤλυθες and εὐφρηνας as perfect ("Thou art come . . . so hast thou gladdened me") and aorist ἔδραμον as present ("I haste").

point or obtaining a favor; it seems rather to follow the speaker's unconstrained, autonomous turns of thought.<sup>54</sup>

The poem's final turn, I think, can be construed as most thoroughly private. It is the second of the speaker's fantasies and marks a second stage of diversion from the present scene. In the first stage, he imagines enjoying perfect love, so precisely balanced that poets will celebrate it forever.<sup>55</sup> The second stage of his fantasy seems to begin where the first stopped, as if nothing intervened: Diocles, immortally celebrated in a Megarian festival, exemplifies the kind of lover the speaker wishes to be.<sup>56</sup> But something has been lost along the way, for what we know from ancient commentators about Diocles says nothing about his friend; a moment ago, the speaker wanted fame only for having shared love equally. Diocles sacrificed his life in battle; was his devotion reciprocated? If so, why is his friend's name not celebrated here as well? If Diocles died for an undeserving boy, we can make better sense of the speaker's developing thought. Theocritus alone among ancient sources mentions a kissing-competition as the form of Diocles' festival.<sup>57</sup> Whether he invented this detail or not, it clearly matters in his plan, for he draws from it the surprising notion that some kisses are false, like counterfeit money. It would be appropriate, I suggest, to celebrate Diocles and his love with such a rite if Diocles himself had long ago failed to distinguish false from sincere professions of faithfulness. As the speaker migrates from one fancy into another, then, he means to be consistent. But the festival of Diocles connotes more than he intended, and it draws him more deeply into suspicion of his imperfectly responsive friend. His new fantasy, therefore, aims at an impersonal kind of pleasure, rather than love, and pleasure judged with a colder eye. The speaker has somehow advanced, with his back-and-forth movement, carried forward willy-nilly by his own discourse. His movement is driven by layered, immiscible feelings: gratitude and remembered pleasure, interleaved with injury and doubt.

I have been arguing that in Hellenistic poetry, we find the speaking persona relaxing into a kind of self-expression distinctly different from its ancestors in archaic and classical poetry. The speaker lapses from a public version of himself, methodically constructed, into a version less

54. Differently, Cairns, *Generic Composition*, p. 30, and S. T. Kelly, "On the Twelfth Idyll of Theocritus," *Helios* 11 (1984): 55–60, both of whom see the poem as unified and expressing a single intention.

55. Oddly, the figures in this picture have no names. The speaker goes out of his way—he draws upon the dialects of Amyclae and Thessaly—to find categorical labels for the two perfect lovers, himself and his auditor: they will be called "In-spirator" and "Listener" (13 εἰσπνηλός, 14 αἰτής); by borrowing words from Amyclae and Thessaly, he dissociates himself from his own specific language and place. (These labels, of course, idealize the present scene of speech, where the speaker pours his fantasy into the boy he addresses.) The speaker's fantasy unfolds in a form so abstract that there is little room for persons: what later generations will remember is not the lovers—named individuals attached specifically to each other—but their perfectly mutual love (20–21 ἢ . . . φιλότης . . . / πᾶσι διὰ στόματος, μετὰ δ' ἡθέοισι μάλιστα).

56. See Gow, *Theocritus*<sup>2</sup>, 2:227.

57. See *ibid.*

controlled and more private. He wanders from his point; he begins to think rather than argue. Frequently, he repeats himself, not for emphasis but from uncertainty. He loses touch with his audience: the corpse in its grave drops out of a conversation; the unyielding sweetheart is forgotten; a real boy is replaced by fantasies. And with the loss of an audience, the speaker's rhetoric becomes unfocused; as the speaker turns inward, conventional structures—epitaph, *paraclausithyron*, *προσφωνητικόν*—begin to dissolve. (That is to say, the poet who wishes to represent a speaker's slide into reflexive speech first sketches some conventional pattern of address and then smudges it.)

Occasionally, in Callimachus, we glimpse a psychological structure that might account for such lapses, a picture consistent with Alexandrian representations of psychic behavior. In archaic poetry, as we saw, the distribution of psychological functions among variously named organs of thought and feeling does not usually generate surprises, perhaps because the self remains essentially unified, and all its parts speak—or at least understand—the same language of rational deliberation. Later, they do not. In Euripides, the archaic way of locating different feelings in different places has real consequences. The subject controls herself less perfectly, and knows herself less well; the old divisions of self are now really fearsome. Alexandrian poetry, later still, no longer divides the self in this way, and Alexandrian speakers seldom invoke *θυμός*, *καρδία*, *φρήν*, or *ψυχή* as distinct organs or structures within the self. In Alexandrian poetry, the self suffers an ambiguous sort of doubling, less easily explained than the functional divisions pictured in earlier poetry.<sup>58</sup> In *Epigram* 41 of Callimachus, we find two souls, or perhaps one; in *Epigram* 31, a disposition owned and disowned, endowed with its own personality; in *Epigram* 28, a voice that does and does not issue from the speaker, from his knowledge and will.

Alexandrian subjects can surprise themselves because they are doubled in this way. Doubling makes for gentle surprises rather than shocks—the self recognizes things already somehow known. The self does not split into warring parties, such as reason and emotion.<sup>59</sup> It merely reflects, losing its identity to itself; or it draws back from reflection, refuses surprise, and so plays out its doubling in the alternative way, as self-deception.<sup>60</sup> In Polyphemus' healing song and the lover's speech in *Idyll* 12, and especially in Callimachus' poem on the half-soul, we find both—surprise and self-deception. The fun comes in disentangling one from the other, a kind of fun, I suggest, first available to Greek readers in third-century Egypt.

58. Plato multiplies souls as much as he divides them, since each part he posits resembles a complete soul in itself; see W. Fortenbaugh, "On the Antecedents of Aristotle's Bipartite Psychology," *GRBS* 11 (1970): 249 with n. 35.

59. Cleanthes, an exception, wrote iambic verses in which Thymos debated Logismos, frag. 570 (*SVF*, 1:129. 35).

60. For self-deception as entailing "boundaries between parts of the mind," a notion no less opaque than Alexandrian doubling, see D. Davidson, "Deception and Division," in *The Multiple Self*, ed. J. Elster (Cambridge, 1986), p. 91.